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LETTERS 
Agony of the 
innocents 
March 7, 1998: An Iraqi woman moums at the tomb of her two-year-old daughter. 
George Lopez and David Cortright's 
article concerning the effect of sanc-
tions on Iraq ("Pain and Promise," May/ 
June 1998) merits comment. Lopez 
and Cortright underestimate the num-
ber of civilians who have died as a di-
rect result of sanctions; a compelling 
case could be made that the number 
of deaths is much closer to a million. 
Nonetheless, they make the point that 
the number of innocents who have 
died as a result of sanctions constitutes 
an "appalling tragedy." 
It was surprising, though, that Lopez 
and Cortright did not follow their anti-
sanctions argument to its logical con-
clusion: When dealing with a despotic 
regime, broad economic sanctions are 
bound to fail and should not be used. 
Broad sanctions leave the target 
regime intact while decimating the 
civilian population, particularly when 
the sanctions are not narrowly tailored 
to achieve the desired goal. 
The Iraqi regime that came to 
power in 1968 has ruled with an effi-
cient brutality worthy of Stalin. One 
year after assuming the presidency, 
Saddam Hussein entered into a war 
against Iran that ultimately caused the 
death of some 250,000 Iraqis. In 1988, 
he ordered the use of poison gas 
against Iraq's Kurdish civilians in Ha-
labcha. The invasion of Kuwait came 
two years later. This history should 
not have made one sanguine about 
the regime's concern for its citizens' 
well-being. 
Economic sanctions were first im-
posed in August 1990 as an alternative 
to war. These same sanctions ostensi-
bly became the instrument for insuring 
the elimination of Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction only after the cease-
fire in March 1991. 
By then, Iraq had been bombed into 
the pre-industrial era. Its electrical 
grid, water-pumping stations, and 
treatment plants were destroyed or 
damaged. The response of the victori-
ous powers was to keep Iraq in a stran-
glehold. Ordinary Iraqis were now 
subject to the good conduct of the 
regime for their very survival. 
The regime had two choices: either 
cooperate in the destruction of its out-
lawed weapons programs (developed 
over nearly two decades at the cost of 
unknown billions), which would insure 
that ordinary Iraqis would not go with-
out; or, hang on to the outlawed 
weapons regardless of the price ordi-
nary Iraqis would have to pay. Given 
Hussein's history, who would have 
thought the question would even be 
close? 
Eight years later, the illogic of the 
continuing sanctions would be laugh-
able were it not tragic. The dual-use 
doctrine, which bans the importation 
of material with both civilian and mili-
tary uses, is illustrative: Chemicals 
needed for purification of drinking 
water are banned, so Iraq's children 
die from water-home diseases. Nitro-
glycerin used to treat cardiovascular 
disease is banned, even though the 
dosage is on the microgram scale. Be-
cause of sanctions, once solidly middle 
class Iraqis now sell what is left of their 
meager possessions for food. Iraq's pre-
war, Western-style health care system 
no longer exists. The simplest medica-
tions Americans buy in any grocery 
store, once ubiquitous, are a dim mem-
ory. Anesthetics and sutures are no 
longer available or affordable. Equip-
ment lies dormant in Iraqi hospitals. 
But the situation is not equally bleak 
for all Iraqis. Last year an assassination 
attempt critically injured Saddam Hus-
sein's son Uday. A team of French sur-
geons was flown into Baghdad. U day, 
who received the best of Western 
medical care, is still very much alive. A 
reasoned observer would ask: At 
whom are the sanctions aimed, and 
who is paying the price? 
The fiction surrounding the oil-for-
food arrangement begs comment. 
Even if Iraq could meet the quotas of 
U.N. Resolution 1153, it would gamer 
only $1.00 worth of food and medical 
supplies per person per day. Because 
humanitarian goods must be purchased 
overseas and shipped to Iraq, the con-
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democratic forms of government are 
still in an embryonic stage. 
In the end, the uneasy and thus-far 
peaceful coexistence of globalization 
and democracy will not last long unless 
several key measures are taken. Long-
worth suggests imposing the "Tobin 
tax," a tax of 0.1 percent on all foreign 
exchange transactions to slow the glob-
al flow of speculative hot money. This 
is an ingenious proposal that would 
rein in the world's volatile capital mar-
kets, where investors resemble the 
hunters of woolly mammoths, stalking 
their prey as they move from one ven-
ture to another-a metaphor em-
ployed by various writers that Long-
worth cites. In their hunt, these fund 
managers destabilize currencies, dis-
rupt relative prices, and bring havoc to 
economic systems. 
Another measure, which would 
spark much more controversy, would 
be the creation of a global central 
bank--or something similar-to sta-
bilize the major currencies. Finally, 
he proposes uniform rules for taxa-
tion, accounting practices, and trans-
action codes in the securities and 
stock markets. 
Longworth is right when he calls for 
a new Bretton Woods-type conference 
to set up rules for global economic co-
ordination. But the nations of the so-
called Third World must be integrated 
into these arrangements. Global secu-
rity depends on it. • 
Alejandro Nadal is a professor of eco-
nomics at El Colegio de Mexico in 
Mexico City and a member of the Bul-
letins Board of Directors. 
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elusion is obvious. This arrangement is 
a cruel hoax, designed to ameliorate 
the conscience of the victorious pow-
ers. Even State Department officials 
acknowledge that the program was 
never intended to meet the minimal 
needs of Iraq's devastated population. 
Maintaining economic sanctions is 
no longer a rational policy. Instead, it 
has become a mantra devoid of reason: 
"Sanctions will not be lifted until Iraq 
is in full compliance with all Security 
Council resolutions." Recently, Cong. 
Lee Hamilton asked Assistant Secre-
tary of State Martin Indyk to define 
"full compliance." Tired of hearing the 
mantra, Hamilton finally had to "de-
mand" that Indyk answer the question. 
Unable to articulate an answer, Indyk 
responded that he would have to reply 
later in writing. 
Despite their harshness and their 
duration, sanctions will not eliminate 
Iraq's outlawed weapons. State De-
partment and Pentagon officials have 
conceded that, at best, the chemical 
and biological programs will have been 
temporarily delayed. There is thus no 
nexus between economic sanctions 
and the U.S. policy of "eliminating" 
the banned weapons programs. That 
being so, there is absolutely no justifi-
cation for prolonging the agony of the 
innocents. 
Military sanctions, including inspec-
tions, are another matter. They should 
be maintained so long as the Ba'athist 
regime, which is a menace to its own 
people as well as to its neighbors, is in 
power. Meanwhile, only deterrence 
has been proven to be effective against 
Hussein. The only civilian population 
he used these outlawed weapons 
against were the Kurds, who could not 
retaliate. During the Iran-Iraq war, 
poison gas was exchanged on the bat-
tlefield, but neither side used such 
weapons against the other's population 
centers. Iraq could have used its out-
lawed weapons again in the 1991 war, 
but, mindful of the consequences, it 
did not. 
As the foregoing was being written, 
proof of the fallacy of economic sanc-
tions emerged. Just as there were seri-
ous discussions yet again that the sane-
tions might be lifted at the end of the 
year, the U.N. Special Commission 
found evidence that Iraq had "weap-
onized" its poison gas program-that it 
had loaded missiles with vx-some-
thing the regime had been denying for 
eight years. 
The sanctions against Iraq have 
been the most crippling and effective 
sanctions imposed in the history of the 
United Nations, and their conse-
quences will be felt for generations. 
Yet they have not caused the regime to 
be forthcoming, because the regime is 
virtually immune from their effects. 
State Department officials repeat the 
mantra while Hussein remains callous-
ly indifferent to the suffering of his 
own people. There is thus a perverse 
complicity between the United States 
and Hussein in perpetrating a geno-
cide on Iraq's population. 
Far from constituting the basis for a 
gradual lifting of sanctions as advocat-
ed by Lopez and Cortright, these facts 
demand an immediate cessation of 
economic sanctions aimed so point-
lessly at Iraq's suffering masses. In the 
end, economic sanctions against Iraq 
have been shown to be a weapon of 
mass destruction, akin to a neutron 
bomb, extracting hellish, torturous 
punishment of innocents, but leaving 
Saddam Hussein free to build palaces 
and play hide-and-seek with the world. 
Feisal Amin al-Istrahadi 
Merrillville, Indiana 
Look to the army 
The July/August issue, which looked at 
the Indian/Pakistani nuclear tests, was 
good. Here, I add just a footnote. 
A week after the May 11 Indian 
tests, Pakistani Prime Minister Mo-
hammad Nawaz Sharif was asked why 
Pakistan had not tested. He answered: 
''Why we are not testing this capability 
is because of the fact I want to show 
the world that Pakistan is a responsible 
country. . . . If India is doing it out of 
sheer madness, we do not have to 
blindly follow suit." 
Less than two weeks later, Pakistan 
tested. Why did this strong, thoughtful 
man finally make the decision to au-
